The ubiquitous and intense nature of stress responses necessitate that we understand how they affect decision-making. Despite a number of studies examining risky decision-making under stress, it is as yet unclear whether and in what way stress alters the underlying processes that shape our choices. This is in part because previous studies have not separated and quantified dissociable valuation and decision-making processes that can affect choices of risky options, including risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency, among others.
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Introduction
Because risky decisions are both ubiquitous and must often be made under stress, it is imperative to understand the interactions between stress and choices under risk. However, despite a number of studies examining acute stress and risky monetary decision-making (see Table S1 ), it is as yet unclear whether and how they interact. In the gain domain, several studies find evidence for more gambling 1 under acute stress (i.e. riskier choices; less risk aversion; more utility function convexity) (Preston et al. 2007; Starcke et al. 2008; Putman et al. 2010; Pabst et al. 2013b; Pabst et al. 2013c) , while others find less gambling under stress (i.e. safer choices; more risk aversion; more utility function concavity) (Porcelli and Delgado 2009; Cingl and Cahlikova 2013) , no changes in gambling (von Dawans et al. 2012; Delaney et al. 2014; Kandasamy et al. 2014) , or both more and less gambling depending on factors like gender (Lighthall et al. 2009; van den Bos et al. 2009 ), time (Pabst et al. 2013a) , trait anxiety and depressive symptoms (Robinson et al. 2015) , or outcome magnitude (von Helversen and Rieskamp 2013) . Even with respect to gender, the findings are equivocal: roughly equal numbers of studies found interactions with gender (Preston et al. 2007; Lighthall et al. 2009; van den Bos et al. 2009 ) as did not (Starcke et al. 2008; Pabst et al. 2013b; von Helversen and Rieskamp 2013; Kandasamy et al. 2014) .
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One reason for this apparent inconsistency may be that, with one exception (Kandasamy et al. 2014 ; see Table S1 ), all the studies mentioned above used the same problematic measure of risky decision-making: a simple probability of gambling. This coarse measure is inadequate because choices between more and less risky options reflect the combined contributions of multiple different processes. For example, someone under stress might gamble less (that is, their probability of gambling might go down) because they dislike the element of chance or risk in the gamble (termed risk attitudes), because they overweight the risky loss relative to the risky gain (termed loss aversion), or simply because they are choosing more (or less) consistently than before despite having the same risk attitudes and loss aversion. Depending on the kinds of choices, other factors can also influence the probability of gambling, including probability weighting (the subjective, as opposed to objective, probability of an event occurring), ambiguity aversion (the distaste for unknown probabilities in decision options), or even dynamic updating when learning in complex, changing, or experiential settings.
Concluding that changes in the probability of gambling are due to changes in attitudes toward risk without dissociating other relevant processes would be analogous to concluding that stress affects memory recall after a study in which participants memorized items and performed a recognition test all while under stress. Such a conclusion would be obviously flawed as differences in recognition could reflect changes in perception, encoding, consolidation, familiarity, or recall -and without careful design and analysis, would all be thoroughly confounded.
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By the same token, the fundamentally different processes underlying risky choices must be simultaneously and separately quantified, or otherwise accounted for, in order to understand the ways in which acute stress does and does not affect decisions under risk.
In this study, we sought to dissociate and quantify three separable decision-making processes under acute stress in a fully-crossed within-subjects design. Briefly, participants came in on each of two days, identical except for experiencing an acute stress or control manipulation with equal probability on each day. Individual differences in HPA axis activity were objectively quantified with four measurements of salivary cortisol per day (Velasco et al. 1997; McRae et al. 2006) . Participants' decision-making was also quantified with a risky decision-making task (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2014; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2015) that, in combination with an econometric model of valuation and decision-making, allowed the separation of risk attitudes, loss aversion, and consistency in decision-making for each participant on each day. Finally, statistically powerful hierarchical Bayesian analysis methods were used to pool the data from 120 participants, both leveraging individual differences and group-level analysis to identify how acute stress affects or spares the three measured processes contributing to risky decision-making.
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Methods
Participants
A total of 122 participants completed the task. Two participants were subsequently dropped when it became apparent that they did not understand the mechanics of the task, leaving a total of 120 participants (64 female; mean age = 22.4, standard deviation = 4.5). Our fully crossed design (Stress or Control condition on each of Day 1 and Day 2) resulted in four groups (Stress-Stress, Stress-Control, Control-Stress, or Control-Control). Participants were evenly distributed (N = 30) across these four groups. One participant was excluded from cortisol analyses as their mean salivary cortisol level was more than thirty standard deviations above the group mean.
All participants provided informed consent in accordance with procedures approved by NYU's University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects.
Study Design
Overall Study Design
All participants came in for two nearly identical sessions, separated by a mean of 5.3 days (standard deviation = 2.7; see Immediately following the conclusion of the CPT (or control), a second saliva sample was collected, and then participants were given an 8-minute break during which they were asked to sit quietly without using any digital devices.
They then gave a third saliva sample, after which they completed the risky decision-making task which took roughly 23 minutes (see below; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2014; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2015) . Finally, participants gave a fourth saliva sample and completed a post-study questionnaire.
Participants were paid $15 per hour, plus their adjusted $30 endowment at the end of each day. Fifteen trials were selected at random from the task and their outcomes summed with the endowment to produce the adjusted 
Risky Decision-Making Task
The main task of interest was a risky monetary decision-making task. As the task we used has been described in detail elsewhere (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009; Sokol-Hessner et al. 2013 ), we will briefly summarize it here. Participants made 150 decisions between risky binary gambles and guaranteed alternatives.
For 120 of the trials, termed "gain-loss trials", the risky gamble consisted of equal chances of winning some amount or losing a different amount (amounts varied trial-to-trial), versus a guaranteed alternative of zero dollars. In the remaining thirty "gain-only trials", the risky gamble yielded a positive amount or zero dollars with equal probability, and the guaranteed alternative was a smaller positive amount. The values used on each trial were unique (i.e. no trials were repeated).
Trial order was random. The 50/50 probabilities used throughout the task effectively eliminated possible roles for ambiguity and probability weighting in the task, as all probabilities were explicitly known, and probabilities did not vary.
On each trial, the choice options were initially presented for 2s. After two seconds had passed, a response prompt ("?") appeared prompting participants to enter their choice within two seconds. This was followed by an inter-stimulus interval (1s), the display of the outcome (either the outcome of the gamble or the M A N U S C R I P T
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Page 10 of 34 guaranteed alternative depending on the participant's choice; 1s), and an intertrial interval (1, 2, or 3s, uniformly distributed) before the next trial began.
The task had no temporal component to eliminate temporal discounting, included only two simple probabilities (0.5 and 1) to minimize the effect of any probability weighting, and was thoroughly instructed in detail and practiced to minimize learning and eliminate ambiguity.
Cortisol Measurement
Salivary samples were collected four times each day for each participant (see Figure 1 ). For each sample, participants held a sterile synthetic polymerbased oral salivette under their tongue for two minutes, after which the swab was placed in a sterile collection tube and frozen at -20°C. Frozen salivary samples were analyzed by Salimetrics Testing Services (a Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments-certified lab; Carlsbad, CA) using high-sensitivity enzyme immunoassay kits to assay cortisol levels.
Analysis
Cortisol analysis
An initial visual inspection of raw cortisol values identified one participant (mentioned in section 2.1, Participants) with a mean salivary cortisol level more than thirty standard deviations above the group mean. This participant was removed from any subsequent cortisol analyses.
To confirm the efficacy of the CPT, we first analyzed the change in cortisol measurement from the baseline cortisol sample taken immediately before the CPT to the three later time points (immediately after the CPT, prior to the M A N U S C R I P T
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Materials for tests within each group, across days and timepoints). To quantify individual differences in cortisol reactivity for use as a covariate in behavioral analyses, we focused on the change in cortisol between the baseline (1) and pretask (3) time points. Because raw cortisol change values were positively skewed, but spanned zero, we used a modified log procedure similar to that used elsewhere (e.g. Otto et al. 2013 ) to reduce skewness while maintaining the meaningfulness of zero values (∆Cortisol = log([Cortisol 3 -Cortisol 1 ]+0.5)-log(0.5)).
Behavioral analysis
Behavioral analysis proceeded in two main portions, the first of which consisted of examining changes in the simple probability of choosing the risky gamble across days as a function of condition (Stress vs. Control), replicating the analysis approach used in many other studies of risky decision-making under stress (see Table S1 ).
For the second main analysis, we fit prospect theory-inspired models of the non-linear processes underlying valuation and choice using a hierarchical Bayesian approach. The basic model was identical to that used previously (see Risky Decision-Making Task) allowed the separation of these three free parameters.
M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Page 13 of 34
The hierarchical Bayesian approach to fitting this model gave us a statistical advantage by explicitly modeling and fitting parameters at the level of the participant (e.g. participant 1's risk attitude) as well as at the level of the group (e.g. the mean population risk attitude). Using such a model, and therefore fitting all participants' data simultaneously, has the effect of reducing the influence of outliers or noise, and thus maximizing 'signal'. It also has the benefit of allowing us to directly model the effect of interest -that is, the effect of acute stress on each of the three valuation and decision processes at both the population and individual participant levels.
Formally, we fit two main models: Model 1 took a "condition" approach (i.e.
Stress/Control as a binary variable), while Model 2 took a "covariate" approach (i.e. the continuous effect of ∆Cortisol).
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Behavior
Simple Probability of Gambling
Replicating previous analysis approaches (see Table S1 ), we examined the simple probability of choosing the gamble in our task. In paired t-tests within condition groups (e.g. Control-Control) comparing the probability of gambling across days, no group showed a significant change in gambling behavior (each N = 30; all p's > 0.18; see Figure S2 ). Collapsing across the Stress-Control and Control-Stress groups (N = 60), paired t-tests revealed no significant difference in gambling under Stress versus Control (p = 0.80).
Hierarchical Behavioral Models
Model 1: Stress/Control Condition
Estimates of the convergence of the chains on similar distributions of parameter samples (Rhat; when Rhat = 1, the model has converged and chains are very similar to each other; values above 1 suggest lack of convergence, i.e.
chains that are very different from one another) indicated that the model fit well (mean Rhat for group-level parameters = 1.01).
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First, we checked the baseline parameter estimates for risk attitudes, loss aversion, and consistency to ensure they replicated previous work (Tom et 
Model 2: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Cortisol
While Model 1 (binary Stress/Control coding) maximally leverages random experimental assignment, doing so ignores individual differences in responses to the stress manipulations. To address this issue, we fit Model 2, in which we We ran additional models to test the sensitivity of these findings to the use of fixed instead of random effects, the use of more constrained models, and nonhierarchical maximum likelihood models. Findings of these ancillary models were identical to those above (see Supplementary Materials).
As 
Basal Cortisol and Behavior
As some studies have found that baseline cortisol values may be related to risky decision-making (Chumbley et al. 2014) , we tested whether basal cortisol values (i.e. the very first cortisol samples, taken prior to any CPT intervention) correlated with any of the individual parameter estimates from the hierarchical Bayesian analysis (see section 3.2.2) for ρ, λ, and/or µ. Because estimates of behavior were calculated after the CPT, this analysis was limited to the 60 participants who were in the Control condition on Day 1 and whose behavior is most clearly at "baseline". We used the parameter estimates calculated from Model 2, but findings were virtually identical using those from Model 1. 
Discussion
Fully 78% of adults in the United States report experiencing stress at some point in the past month (APA 2016), making it critical to understand whether and how intense and pervasive affective states like stress interact with decision-making. Here, we pursued this question using a large within-subjects design, an econometric model of valuation and decision-making that dissociates three underlying decision processes in risky decision-making, hierarchical
Bayesian analysis that maximally combines data while allowing for heterogeneity in behavior, and objectively quantified endogenous acute stress responses. In doing so, we find no evidence for an effect of acute stress on risk attitudes, loss aversion, or consistency over choices.
We do find effects of repeated participation in the study, in that participants are more loss averse and more consistent on the second day relative to the first. A previous study from our lab also used a two-day design with the same task and although we observed increases in loss aversion on the second day, the increases were unrelated to Day 1 payment, and there were no changes in consistency (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2015) . Thus, while we encourage caution, especially in interpreting the effect of repetition on consistency, it does appear that participants weigh losses more heavily on their second day. One explanation could be that participants treated the money as "house money" (e.g. not their own) on the first day, despite our detailed instructions. When participants were paid real money at the end of the first day, they might have then returned on the second day, somehow more invested in the task, leading to greater loss aversion M A N U S C R I P T
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Page 25 of 34 and consistency. However, while payment on Day 1 was correlated with the change in loss aversion, it did not correlate with changes in consistency.
Additionally, this mechanism might also predict greater risk aversion for gains (risk seeking for losses), which we did not observe. As our study was not designed to test this hypothesis, we must rely upon future work for more definitive tests.
Though we find no effect of acute stress on risk attitudes (or loss aversion or consistency), what might explain previous findings to the contrary? First, it's possible that acute stress alters a decision-making process that we did not measure or manipulate in our study (e.g. probability weighting, temporal discounting, learning rates, ambiguity attitudes), but which was confounded with risky choices in other studies. As the vast majority of previous studies used the simple probability of gambling to assess risk attitudes (see Table S1 ), such conflation is very possible. For example, the Iowa Gambling Task and the Game of Dice Task are particularly popular paradigms, accounting for no fewer than seven of the previous studies on risky decision-making and stress, but their variable-probability, mixed gain & loss designs conflate many possible decisionmaking processes. Our task also had real monetary consequences and showed participants their outcomes on a trial-by-trial basis -hypothetical choices (or choices without feedback) may be differentially affected. Finally, it is of course possible that an overarching explanation for previously inconsistent findings may be relatively weak statistical power, either within the task (e.g. few trials) or at the study level (e.g. few participants; a brief review of the literature identifies a M A N U S C R I P T
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More generally, this study examined decisions made over relatively simple explicitly described risky monetary options. To the extent to which decisions in other situations may involve other kinds of options, it is possible that stress may affect decision-making -but our findings suggest that such an effect would not be due to changes in risk attitudes, loss aversion, or choice consistency.
Additionally, while this study focused on acute stress, there is evidence that chronic, longer-term stress may alter decisions under risk. One study found that cortisol administration for eight consecutive days increased risk aversion (decreased gambling; Kandasamy et al. 2014) , while another used hair samples to estimate approximate cortisol exposure over the previous two months, finding that chronic levels of cortisol were unrelated to risk attitudes but instead were negatively correlated with loss aversion (Chumbley et al. 2014 ).
The differences between endogenous and exogenous cortisol, acute and participants gave a second salivary sample, waited 10 minutes for salivary cortisol levels to rise, and gave a third (pre-task) salivary sample. Participants then completed the risky decision-making task allowing estimation of risk attitudes (ρ, in green), loss aversion (λ, in red), and choice consistency (µ, in blue), after which they gave the fourth and final salivary sample, and completed a few basic debriefing questionnaires assessing their experience. The second day was identical to the first, except participants had an equal and independent chance of performing the CPT or lukewarm water control on each day. 
